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1Abstract:
Political ecologists have considered the social and economic impacts that nature reserves,
national parks and other forms of protected area can have on neighbouring communities, and
how this can generate conflicts between them. This paper analyses such conflicts through the
lens of territoriality, considering how the way protected area territories are created,
delineated, and defined is linked to the social impacts experienced by local people. Conflicts
between locals and conservation authorities over protected areas are about rival attempts to
define the boundaries of protected areas, who the land should belong to, what it should be
used for, and what its purpose is. Yet the ability of local people or conservation authorities to
impose their meaning is unequal. It illustrates these processes with the example of a scientific
reserve in the Dominican Republic, and a decades-long conflict to define what the reserve
should mean, what it should look like, and who it should belong to.
Keywords: conservation, protected area, territoriality, political ecology, Dominican Republic
21.1 INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, national parks, reserves, and other forms of protected area have expanded
across the world, currently covering more than 12 percent of the earth’s land surface area.
This expansion has involved the creation of new territorial entities and new rules over the use
of these places. This often creates considerable conflict between protected areas and resident
and neighbouring communities over the meaning of these areas, what purpose they serve,
whom should they benefit, and who gets to decide all this, particularly when conservation
regulations negatively affect the wellbeing of local people. These conflicts have been the
subject of numerous studies within political ecology, and have been analysed through various
theoretical lenses, including post-colonialism and neo-colonialism (Butt, 2012; MacDonald,
2005; Neumann, 1998; Roth, 2004), everyday resistance (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010;
Norgrove and Hulme, 2006; Robbins et al., 2006), and new forms of neoliberal governance
(Buscher and Dressler, 2007; Fletcher, 2010; Sachedina, 2010; Vacanti-Brondo and Bown,
2011). This paper argues, following Roth (2008) and Corson (2011), that protected areas are
projects of territorialisation, and conflicts over protected areas are in large part battles to
define and defend territories, and therefore territoriality provides a useful lens for
understanding conflicts over protected areas. Territoriality is “the attempt to affect,
influence, or control actions, interactions, or access by asserting and attempting to enforce
control over a specific geographic area” (Sack 1983, p55). Territorialisation involves
delineating a particular space, determining what behaviour and activities are and are not
allowed within it, giving it particular political and social meaning, and communicating this
delineation and meaning to others. It is a political process, serving particular social, political,
or economic ends, pursued to make control over space easier.
3Territorialisation is a useful lens for understanding protected areas for two reasons. Firstly,
protected areas are attempts to create new spatial units, with new meanings, and are therefore
acts of territorialisation. Whilst all struggles over natural resources involve an element of
territory, as different actors compete to access, define, and own, resources, this is more
pronounced with protected areas, where struggles are strongly grounded in clearly defined
spatial units (Roth, 2008). Secondly, territorialisation illuminates key processes occurring in
and around protected area which have been analysed by political ecologists, in particular how
protected areas impact local communities and their economy, society, and culture, and how
these communities in turn try to reshape and redefine protected areas to their liking.
The paper begins by exploring protected areas as products of state “internal territorialisation”
(Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995), showing that territorialisation is a useful concept in political
ecology analyses of conservation, particularly on the social impacts of protected areas and
resistance to them. It then describes a decades-long conflict between a protected area and
local populations in the Dominican Republic. It explores the variety of strategies used to
assert and defend territorialities, such as violence, legal-juridical means, everyday resistance,
and discursive strategies, and demonstrates the relative success of reserve authorities and
local people in asserting control over various areas. This paper adds to the political ecology
literature on the social impacts of protected areas by providing a detailed case study of power,
territorialisation and resistance around one scientific reserve.
1.2 Territorialisation, political ecology and the social impacts of protected areas
4Protected area territorialisation is best understood through internal territorialisation
(Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995), where states sub-divide their territory, creating territorial
units within national boundaries, defining these and determining what happens within them,
in particular deciding who gets access and use rights to resources, and how these are realised.
This is done firstly in abstract form, as state institutions create maps of a terrain, its people
and resources, and use these to delineate different territorial units such as protected areas in
maps, laws, and official documents such as management plans, ascribing political, economic,
social and cultural meanings to these places. Subsequently, these are defined more
concretely, by enforcing land uses in reality. Internal territorialisation allows states to justify
coercing its own citizens, and the rights to use the newly defined and created territories can
be allocated to private entities as well as the state (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995). States
sometimes create protected areas to extend their control over remote or ungovernable parts of
their country, particularly during frontier expansion or for geostrategic reasons (Roth, 2008,
Aageson, 2010, Ybarra 2012, Monterroso and Barry, 2012). Conservation NGOs sometimes
provide political, technical, financial, and discursive support for state internal
territorialisation of protected area, part of global shifts to neoliberal forms of conservation
which emphasise civil society’s role in saving biodiversity in place of the state (Corson,
2011, Sundberg, 1998, 2003). NGOs are particularly influential the global south, where states
are often unwilling or unable to invest in biodiversity conservation (Corson, 2010, 2011, Igoe
and Brockington, 2007, Sundberg, 1998, 2003). Territorialisation happens in protected areas
under all forms of governance, but this paper deals with state and NGO managed protected
areas rather private or community areas, which have distinct territorialisation processes
(Corson, 2011).
5Below I identify three ways in which territoriality adds to political ecology research on such
interactions between protected areas and local people. It does not claim to show universal
processes but rather to illustrate some phenomena involved, particularly around stricter, state
protected areas.
Firstly, protected areas have historically followed the binary distinction between nature and
human society dominant in much of Western thought. There is often a clear separation in
both discourses and policies on protected areas between places for nature and places for
people. Protected areas become designated as places for nature, and most human activities
within them (other than certain legitimate activities such as tourism and research) are deemed
illegitimate, inappropriate and out of place. Regulations and policies restricting the presence
of illegitimate people from a protected area’s territory are backed by popular and policy
discourses that see protected areas as people-free places. The early history of US
conservation attempted to create protected areas as wildernesses, places untrammelled by
human hands, based on a binary distinction between society and nature, although to establish
such people-free territories, resident populations of Native Americans and European settlers
had to be removed (Cronon, 1996; Jacoby, 2001; Spence, 1999). . Ironically, “uninhabited
wilderness had to be created before it could be preserved” (Spence, 1999, p4) - a new,
historically problematic, meaning had to be imposed in the territorialisation of a protected
area, discursively, legally, and physically. Similarly, imperial authorities in British East
Africa created protected areas as people-free places, yet in order to do so, resident
populations had to be removed against their will, with widespread state violence
characterising the creation of these areas, and their maintenance in subsequent decades
(Neumann, 1998; 2001). Neumann (2004) shows how media discourses legitimise state
violence in current conservation practice based on ideas of protected areas as people-free
6places. There are also contemporary cases of eviction for conservation, which may be linked
to the rising influence of international conservation NGOs promoting western ideals of
protected areas as people free places (Brockington and Igoe, 2006; Chapin, 2004; Sundberg,
2003).
Evicted populations suffer from long-term economic and social disruption and deprivation,
and resentment and opposition to this can last many decades (Craig et al., 2012; Stern, 2008).
Even where people are not physically removed from their homes, the creation of people-free
protected areas can have considerable negative social impacts, as long-standing livelihood
activities are banned or greatly restricted, or as people are removed from culturally important
places. The impacts of protected areas are often unequally distributed by gender, class, caste,
or ethnicity (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Holmes and Brockington, 2013). There can be
positive benefits from this territorialisation process, such as when evictions come with
sufficient compensation (Beazley, 2009; Kabra, 2009), or when the new legitimate activities
such as tourism bring new sources of income, although such benefits are often subject to elite
capture (Ojeda, 2012; Vacanti-Brondo and Bown, 2011; ). Not all protected areas are spaces
for people-free nature. Some protected areas, particularly community and indigenous areas,
are intended as places for local people, formalising and strengthening their control and rights
over a place, and combining this with biodiversity conservation. This is still problematic
when people and activities are excluded when they are seen as insufficiently indigenous or
local (Cardozo, 2011, Sundberg, 2006). Mollett (2010) shows how state attempts to create
simplistic distinctions over which ethnic groups had a legitimate presence in different parts of
the Rio Platano Biosphere Reserve in Honduras, in place of more complex and shifting
identities and spatialities, led to hardships and increased inter-ethnic conflict. Additionally,
the process of formalising and codifying customary titles in written form during the reserve’s
7creation disenfranchised certain groups, particularly women. Secondly, many protected areas
still contain resident human populations, despite this being illegal (Lasgorceix and Kothari,
2009), due to a lack of will or ability to sufficiently enforce regulations – an incomplete
territorialisation. Many protected areas are subdivided into sections which allow greater or
lesser amounts of human activity, particularly the Biosphere model found throughout Latin
America (e.g. Mollett, 2010; Sundberg, 2006), which contains a strictly protected core
surrounded by a buffer zone allowing limited resource use. One protected area can contain
several clearly delineated sub-territories, each with their own designated purpose and
ownership.
A second link between how protected areas are territorialised and their social impacts is that,
excluding community or private areas, they tend to be demarcated and managed in a
centralised and top down manner by a distant authority, mainly the state, but increasingly
with involvement from international conservation NGOs and aid agencies. States and their
allies often claim to be representing a much broader constituency than local people, saving
biodiversity for its intrinsic value on behalf of all of humanity, or for the economic wellbeing
of the whole country. This implies that ownership and control of protected areas and their
resources should reside with them, rather than local people (Grandia, 2007; Ojeda, 2012).
The creation of global maps and models identifying priority sites for conservation actions,
and of global targets for protected area coverage, has allowed protected area planning to
operate at a global scale (Brooks et al., 2006; Grandia, 2007; Rodriguez et al., 2007).
Grandia (2007) shows how conservation NGOs devised plans to create a Mesoamerican
Biodiversity Corridor, transcending national boundaries, which argued that these same NGOs
were the only organisations with sufficient resources and expertise to manage such a project.
8Sundberg (1998; 2003) shows the considerable power of international NGOs in Guatemala’s
Maya Biosphere Reserve, and their role in imposing exclusionary and top-down conservation
models which are more accountable to distant donors and funders than to local people. Even
where programmes to devolve control to local communities exist, state actors may
recentralise power to capture income from tourism (Nelson and Agrawal, 2008; Ojeda,
2012,). The increasing integration of protected areas into global capitalism, through industries
such as tourism or carbon sequestration, can also place control with distant actors, leading to
charges of land-grabbing (Kelly, 2011).
Delineation and definition at a distance affects local people in various ways. Firstly, any
benefits from protected areas may be reallocated to distant authorities and away from local
people, particularly if these distant authorities write the regulations, management plans, and
contracts defining the protected area in a way that they retain control and benefits (Nelson
and Agrawal, 2008; Hoffman, 2009). Residents in Tayrona National Park in Colombia were
deemed illegitimate and evicted in order to develop a tourism sector whose main beneficiary
were the state and its allies (Ojeda, 2012). Secondly, distant authorities may not fully
understand or recognise local land uses and relationships with the land contained within a
protected area, and may consequently create an area whose boundaries and regulations
greatly disrupt them. Protected areas produce relatively homogenous economic and political
spaces, defined by singular and relatively static maps and management plans, in place of
more complex, overlapping, and flexible spatialities that local people may have (Roth, 2008).
Global, regional or national cartographic models used to identify sites for protected areas are
often blind to local politics (Smith et al., 2009). The Mesoamerican Biodiversity Corridor’s
top down design prevented the emergence of alternative, locally produced plans for
biodiversity and development (Grandia, 2007). Even protected areas with buffer or multiple
9use zones create only two or three categories of land, whereas previously there may have
been many more. As a consequence of such a disconnect, local people may find longstanding
livelihood practices restricted, access to important resources limited, with long term social,
economic, and cultural impacts. The geographical and political distance between people
living near protected areas and the institutions which control it limits opportunities for local
resistance, as explored below.
Following directly from the previous two links, a third link between protected area
territorialisation and social impacts is that changes in territoriality are never smooth, but
contested (Sikor and Lund, 2011). The territorialisation of protected areas does not impose
meanings on an empty landscape, but rather attempts to insert and maintain new definitions
and meanings in dynamic social, political and cultural landscapes, where local people have
their own territories, structures, and definitions. Sometimes, a protected area’s establishment
is a subtle change, evolving from previous territories (Rangarajan, 2001), but some entail
radical changes to resource ownership and use (Roth, 2008; Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995;
West, 2006). New meanings and territories may conflict with previous ones, and protracted
disputes may result. Acts of hunting become redefined as poaching, resource use is redefined
as theft, access is redefined as trespass, and humanised landscapes are redefined as
wilderness. Rather than new meanings displacing the old, there is a process of negotiation,
where the state and local people each try to shape the protected area’s boundaries, rules, and
meanings. This negotiation can be violent, as protected area regulations are enforced by
armed guards backed up by legal and juridical measures, and local people in turn use violence
against guards to assert their own land uses (Norgrove and Hulme, 2006; Orlove, 2002).
Other times resistance is more subtle, such as through non-cooperation and acts of petty
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resistance (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010; Heatherington, 2001; Holmes, 2007; Norgrove
and Hulme, 2006; Scott, 1985; Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995). Both local people and the
state try to assert discursive hegemony, to get their version of the area’s definition and
purpose accepted as standard, and undermine the legitimacy of the other’s (Nygren, 2004).
For example, in many Latin American protected areas, local people claim local or indigenous
rights to have greater legitimacy over state conservation efforts (Ojeda, 2012; Sundberg,
2003; Vacanti-Brondo and Bown, 2012). State mapping and cartography delineating
protected areas can be met with counter-cartographies, such as local counter-mapping of
alternative meanings for these places (Hodgson and Shroeder, 2002; Peluso, 1995), or the
moving or replacement of official markers delineating protected area boundaries (Geisler et
al., 1997; Neumann, 1998; Norgrove and Hulme, 2006). Importantly, the ability to shape and
define a protected area is not distributed equally. The state has considerable resources to
determine and defend the territoriality of protected areas: a monopoly on violence through
armed park guards, legal-juridical processes, financial resources, and the possibility of
mobilising discourses on a large scale. Local people lack these resources, and also have to
combine actions to reshape protected areas with maintaining livelihoods on a day to day basis
(Holmes, 2007). Consequently, opposition and resistance to protected areas tend to be petty,
subtle, disorganised and low level (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010; Holmes, 2007).
The above describes a dichotomy between two sets of actors: a top down, distant state (or its
allies) creating protected area territories, and local communities trying to reshape these
territories to their liking through village scale micro-politics. Such a binary indicates the
importance of the scales at which decisions over protected areas are made. People living in
and around protected areas have limited abilities to shape them, and find it almost impossible
to “jump scales” (Smith, 1996), to transcend the local and participate in arenas where
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protected area policy is decided. Local opposition to protected areas tends to stay local.
People living in and around protected areas are often amongst the most marginalised in
society, disconnected from national arenas of power (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Buergin,
2003). Where local people have jumped scale to have their voices heard at a higher level, it is
often because there has been a bridging organisation facilitating this, such as a NGO or
campaigning journalist (Almudi and Berkes, 2010; Beazley, 2009). More generally, studies
of struggles over environmental resources in Latin America have shown how local people can
jump scales and become empowered by tapping into national discourses on identity (Haarstad
and Floysand, 2007), or through national scale organisations which coordinate local or
indigenous concerns (Hennessey, 2012). In contests over protected areas, there tends to be
stark inequalities in different actors’ ability to be politically active at different scales.
The above discussion identifies four trends; protected areas are produced by internal
territorialisation; this territorialisation can be linked to the social impacts of protected areas;
it is a contested process; and these struggles are uneven, particularly because the actors
involved operate at different scales. The case study of Ebano Verde scientific reserve outlined
below shows how territorialisation and resistance played out over a twenty year period in a
small scientific reserve in the Dominican Republic.
2.1 INTERNAL TERRITORIALISATION AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The Dominican Republic is an interesting place to study protected area creation and
enforcement, as it has one of the highest percentages of land under strict protection of any
country, despite being relatively poor and densely populated (Holmes, 2010). Protected areas
here have long been implicated in wider processes of state internal territorialisation. The first
protected areas were created during the first US occupation (1916-22) to protect the
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watersheds of rivers which irrigated lowland sugar and tobacco agriculture (Moya Pons 1995;
Turits 2003). A principle aim of the occupation was to repay foreign debts and to secure
water supply for export agriculture, along with complete restructuring of land tenure and
property rights, were key parts of this (Franks, 1999, Moya Pons 1995; Turits 2003). The
protected area system expanded during the Trujillo dictatorship (1930-61), particularly as
large national parks were established in the forested central highlands to increase state (and
therefore the Trujillo family’s) control over land and timber resources (Bolay, 1997).
Trujillo’s kleptocratic rule used state apparatus to extend his family’s domination of the
economy, described by Moya Pons (1995, p359) as “a regime of total plunder organized to
furnish him with total control of every economic enterprise existing in the country”. During
the Trujillo era, the state’s control finally extended to the whole country – historically, the
mountainous centre was beyond colonial and subsequent government control, a place to
which refugees from state or warlord oppression fled (Turits, 2003).
Protected area expansion was greatest during the Balaguer presidencies (1966-78 and 1986-
1996), particularly the second period, as a well-connected elite within Balaguer’s highly
centralised government pushed for the creation of protected areas (Holmes, 2010). These
areas were strongly protectionist, emphasising strict prohibitions imposed by a top-down state
with no community participation, with regulations enforced by Foresta, the notoriously
violent quasi-military forestry police (Geisler et al., 1997; Holmes, 2010; Rocheleau et al.,
2001; Roth, 2001). Planning was minimal, boundaries were not clearly delineated, and many
areas created during this time still lack management plans (Geisler et al., 1997; Holmes,
2010). Consequently, the protected area system covers over a fifth of the country, but it is
poorly planned, lacks resources, and provokes considerable opposition from people living
nearby. The ministry of environment retain centralised control because of a lack of resources
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to devolve management to communities or other organisations, and a desire to retain control
(Holmes, 2010). Whilst Balaguer’s motives for creating such a large protected area system
remain opaque, the reclassification of land as protected did, like his wider land reform
programmes, allow him to dispossess political opponents of their property and reward
supporters through selectively applied compensation schemes (Ferguson 1992; Holmes,
2010; Moya Pons, 1995). Whilst many other Latin American countries have strict protected
areas enacted without consultation which have severe social impacts on local communities,
the Dominican Republic is unique because it has no populations of pre-Columbian descent,
and large international NGOs have a notably thin presence there (Holmes, 2010).
2.2 The Creation of Ebano Verde Scientific Reserve as a Process of Territorialisation.
The case study site, Ebano Verde Scientific Reserve, is a small category Ia area (the strictest
level of protection, prohibiting all resource uses except scientific research) in the central
highlands, protecting 30km2 of montane cloud forest since 1989. The reserve is, unusually for
the Dominican Republic, relatively well defined, well financed, and administered by an
NGO. The reserve’s history shows it to be an attempt to create a new territory, with defined
borders and particular meanings, in an area where local people have their own territories and
meanings, resulting in nearly two decades of sustained and dynamic conflict to define
territories. The evolution and outcomes of this conflict reflects the unequal abilities of
protected area authorities and local people to define and defend the boundaries and the
meaning of the protected area.
To study the area, I spent 5 months in 2006-2007 living on the reserve’s borders, with an
additional month in the Dominican capital, Santo Domingo. During this time, I interviewed
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40 actors in Dominican conservation, from government, NGOs, activists, and aid
organisations, as well as constructing detailed oral histories of the two villages on the
reserve’s border using multiple semi structured interviews with 56 villagers, and a livelihoods
survey of all village households. Two participatory exercises on farming practices were
conducted with local men. Multiple semi-structured interviews were conducted with all 7
reserve guards, the reserve administrator and the director of the NGO administering the
reserve. Throughout this time, interactions between reserve staff and villagers were observed,
along with those between villagers. Together, this allowed a detailed picture to emerge of the
reserve’s creation, its effect on local people, and the evolution of the relationship between
them. Accessing villagers and reserve authorities was straightforward. One of the villages (El
Arroyazo), where most of my work was concentrated, had seen two Peace Corps volunteers
spend extended periods living and working there, including one less than a year prior to my
arrival. As such, villagers were accustomed to outsiders living within the village. I was
always clear about my identity as an independent researcher, and there were no signs that I
was associated as working for the reserve, the state, or any other party by any research
participants.
The reserve is located at approximately 1000m in altitude. The surrounding area was first
settled in the 1950s following the creation of a logging road to service a short lived lumber
mill – the island’s indigenous population were exterminated by the Spanish by 1550, and the
central mountains were only re-colonised in the mid-19th century (Moya Pons, 1995; Turits,
2003). The forest feeding the mill was declared as state owned open access land, and settlers
claimed surrounding land as private property, receiving formal titles. They practiced
traditional conuco shifting cultivation of manioc, plantain, sweet potato and beans on private
land but mainly on the open forest, occasionally selling excess to distant markets. Villagers
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frequently stated that the purpose of state property is to provide for its citizens and that
consequently peasants had a right to earn a living from the forest. As such, they argued that
Foresta recognised and tolerated subsistence activity, even as it strictly prohibited and harshly
punished other infractions such as cutting lumber for sale. The forest was also used for
keeping animals and as a source of timber, primarily for subsistence use but also to sell to
dealers, particularly pine (Pinus Occidentalis) and Ebano Verde (Magnolia Pallenscens), an
attractive hardwood highly valued by cabinet makers, endemic to the reserve site and another
small patch of forest 40km away. Cash was also gained through occasional day labour in
nearby coffee plantations. Whilst no titles were granted for land in the forest, villagers
reported that they recognised each other’s temporary ownership over land whilst in
cultivation, without any conflicts. By 1989, two villages – La Sal and El Arroyazo - had been
established on the forest periphery, each with approximately 50 households (see map). Each
family farmed on average some 1.25 hectares of forest, an amount suitable for feeding a
family and limited more by the labour needed to maintain it than availability. The sloping
land inside the forest was preferred as it was better suited to traditional subsistence crops than
the flatter and wetter private land outside, with some 92% of families from El Arroyazo
farming there.
The reserve’s creation results from the well connected elite controlling Fundación Progressio
(FP), the NGO administering the reserve. Established in the early 1980s, FP’s president is a
prominent banker, and its board of directors includes Roman Catholic cardinals, former
newspaper editors and senior judges (Holmes, 2010). Others within the fractious Dominican
NGO sector resent FP’s status, with one interviewee describing them as “elitist millionaires”
(interview, Santo Domingo, December 2006). In the late 1980s, FP’s president grew
concerned about the plight of the Ebano Verde tree, threatened with extinction because of
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logging, compounded by its limited range and slow growth. The wider forest ecosystem,
which includes other endemic plants, was considered threatened by shifting cultivation.
Using his close connections to Balaguer’s regime, he successfully proposed creating a reserve
to protect the forest, which was established by government decree in November 1989,
encompassing the state owned forest and some private properties specially purchased from
large landowners using funds from a debt-for-nature programme. Uniquely for the Dominican
Republic, whilst the reserve remains state property, FP were granted full responsibility for
managing and financing it, holding the land in trust. This reflects their political status, and
gave them considerable autonomy. Here, FP are a proxy actor subcontracted to do the state’s
work, able to use the fundamental tools of the state - their guards had a local legitimised
monopoly on violence, able to enforce reserve regulations at gunpoint. Unlike other
discussions of NGO involvement in protected area territorialisation (e.g. Corson, 2011) this is
not due to shifts towards neoliberal governance but to the peculiarities of Balaguer era
politics (Holmes, 2010). FP, like the state, have a strict protectionist view of conservation
(Holmes, 2010, Armenteros, 1989) – the reserve policies, decided upon in the capital,
emphasise banning activities, enforced by harsh punishments, rather than local participation
or giving local people incentives to conserve. The reserve, as it is run by a well connected
and relatively well funded NGO rather than the state, is relatively free from party politics,
clientelism, and corruption commonplace in the Dominican state, but also from democratic
accountability. A senior official within the Protected Areas Directorate described the reserve
as “a private plot.... where they do what they want to do” (interview, Santo Domingo,
November 2006), where his department has no authority. FP have more money than the
grossly underfunded state areas, and consequently, the reserve was assessed as the best
managed protected area in the country (Abt Associates, 2002).
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The discussions over creating the reserve were conducted entirely in Santo Domingo between
FP and the government, with no communication with local communities, save for some brief
contact between villagers and biologists contracted to survey forest flora. Within four weeks
of the reserve’s legal establishment, the villagers were informed by Foresta officers that the
forest was now a reserve, and they had one month to stop using it, but that there would be
agricultural outreach projects, education programmes, and new economic opportunities
through tourism, which villagers understood as promises of compensation for lost resources.
Despite the very significant livelihood implications of abandoning the forest, villagers
acquiesced without resistance for three reasons. Firstly, the perceived promises of
compensation gave many villagers an initially positive view of the reserve. One resident of
La Sal commented that the reserve was “welcomed” by the community because of them
(fieldnotes, March 2007), whilst a housewife in El Arroyazo commented that, in contrast to
current antagonistic relationships, the commitments meant that “we saw the other side of their
face” (fieldnotes, January 2007). Secondly, villagers were fearful of violence from Foresta –
within the villages, stories of harsh punishment and violent enforcement of regulations by
Foresta were common (see Rocheleau et al., 2001; Roth, 2001). One old farmer explained
how he and his neighbours stopped farming the forest because of Foresta’s history of
violence “people would die [in punishments from Foresta].... it is better to leave all you had
than to die” (interview, El Arroyazo, January 2007). Even as the reserve began to employ
their own guards after a few months, the villagers retained their initial fear of violence
because they “respected the uniform” (interview, El Arroyazo, February 2007), meaning they
associated the new guards with Foresta. Thirdly, villagers considered any project led by the
state, a corporation, or other powerful outsider, as impervious to the peasantry’s challenges,
and consequently resistance was futile. Explaining why he acquiesced to the reserve’s
demand that he abandon his farmland, one farmer commented that “the big dog always eats
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the small dog” (interview, El Arroyazo, February 2007). During two separate conversations
with groups of villagers in El Arroyazo, who were agitatedly explaining how the reserve’s
creation devastated their livelihoods, I asked why they had not tried to reclaim their land. On
both occasions, they indicated the impossibility of this, replying: “imagine, what can you do
with an organisation like that?” (fieldnotes, January 2007). This was compounded by the
minimal notice given to villagers before the reserve was created, preventing organised or
coordinated resistance – one farmer explained that the reserve “grabbed us by the throat”
(interview, January 2007).
From the villagers’ perspective, the reserve’s initial establishment represents rapid, top down,
unilateral territorialisation. Almost overnight, a new territorial entity was created, taking a
forest farmed by villagers, albeit without owning it, whose purpose was understood by
villagers as providing them with a living, and reclassifying it as strictly protected, firmly
belonging to the state and its allies, where villagers’ presence was banned. The only
legitimate activities were research and ecotourism, both non-consumptive and easily
controlled by the reserve, although neither produces more than a handful of visitors annually,
and villagers have no means to benefit from them. Losing access to the forest had severe and
immediate livelihood impacts: at present, 43% of households in El Arroyazo own no land,
and 26% own fewer than 0.4 hectares. These households are reliant on often precarious
waged labour in coffee plantations and commercial agriculture in neighbouring communities.
All families but one sold their livestock, as grazing was scarce, and resources previously part
of the subsistence economy, such as timber for building houses, now had to be purchased at
considerable expense. The transition from subsistence to market dominated economy had
more than just an economic impact, but also socio-cultural effects. Several villagers argued
that life was “better” (mejor) prior to the reserve because they were self-reliant, rather than
needing to sell produce or labour to purchase things (basic foodstuffs, building materials)
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which they previously produced for themselves. They were clear that this “better” life was a
socio-cultural evaluation, different from a more “comfortable” (comodo) life, meaning more
material comfortable with electricity, piped water, and better transport, which all appeared
subsequent to the reserve’s creation, in unrelated developments (fieldnotes, January-march
2007).
The process of unilateral territorial re-writing continued throughout the reserve’s first year.
Promised compensation did not arrive, assistance programmes were cancelled after a few
months or failed to appear, and regulations were tightened – for example, villagers were
required to sign a register each time they entered the reserve, and some were refused entry.
This, and the construction of watchtowers at key entrance points, increased the reserve’s
surveillance powers. The social impacts experienced were linked the process of
territorialisation, particularly the redefinition of land from a lived environment whose
purpose was to support the citizenry, to an empty place for biodiversity, and the top down
process of creation which prevented local people from presenting their own vision for the
reserve, compounded by a fear of violence and a sense of impotence.
In 1990 FP declared a buffer zone encompassing all privately owned land within
approximately five kilometres of the reserve’s periphery, roughly doubling the area they
claimed a right to control, including the entirety of the two villages. This unilateral act had no
legal basis, as buffer zones were not established in Dominican law until the late 2000s,
although villagers were never aware that the buffer zone was a de facto construct of FP rather
de jure legal structure. FP and the guards used it to intervene in everyday farming practices
on private property, gradually banning common procedures such as fishing for river crabs and
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burning stubble in fields, and preventing any tree felling, under threat of arrest. As FP’s
director explained, “we played a little game” with villagers, telling them the buffer was part
of the reserve to justify intervening in private land, as he considered that Foresta were not
sufficiently regulating harmful farming practices. He argued that the goal of protecting the
forest justified the means used to achieve it, stating that “it doesn’t matter how, or the
methods used to protect [the forest], because once it is gone that is it” (interview, Santo
Domingo, December 2007). Private farmland became part of the reserve’s territory without
owners’ consent, and its meaning changed accordingly. The ability to declare and attempt to
enforce a buffer zone despite having no legal basis shows the significant territorialisation
powers that FP possessed, and further demonstrates the reserve’s top-down nature.
2.3 Resistance and counter-territorialisation
Within a few years, villagers began to resist the reserve due to rising discontent at strict
regulations and lack of promised compensation, and because villagers began to realise that
guards, whilst harsh, were not as violent or corrupt as Foresta, and were therefore not to be
similarly feared. This resistance was an attempt to renegotiate the boundaries and meanings
of the reserve.
Firstly, various villagers who had the skill to do so would enter the reserve to harvest wood or
feral crops, in what Kull (2004) calls implicit resistance – knowingly breaking rules whilst
challenging the rules’ legitimacy. For example, walking down the road one evening in El
Arroyazo, I struck up conversation with a villager who was waiting for dark so he could
move some timber, freshly cut from the forest, down to the road without detection.
Explaining that he was going to sell them to a nearby wealthy farmer to use as poles
supporting crops, he acknowledged that his actions, whilst illegal, were justified because he
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needed to earn a living, and that “the poor person has to live” (fieldnotes, March 2007). In his
view, conservation regulations impinged the peasantry’s long standing moral right to sustain
themselves using wild nature, and that his fellow villagers shared this view and tacitly
supported such actions by not reporting him. On another occasion, a conversation with a
farmer in his field turned to the subject of the peasantry’s right to “defend themselves” and
earn a living, and how the reserve had infringed this by preventing him from farming in the
forest. The farmer angrily exclaimed “Progressio want to stop us from living. If a poor man
can’t work his little bit of land, what do they want us to do, steal?” (fieldnotes, March 2007.
It was common knowledge within the village which residents would remove wood and other
resources, and many perpetrators admitted to it. One explained to me that he cut timber on
request for farmers or furniture makers, and detailed how he avoided detection, such as
entering the reserve on certain days when he knew there were fewer staff around. He
expressed indignation that guards sided with their employers rather than fellow peasants and
their moral economy “The reserve people are talkers. When they find something they don’t
do what they are supposed to do and keep quiet, they go and tell Foresta” (interview, El
Arroyazo, December 2007). Villagers frequently stated that they preferred Foresta’s
regulations to FP’s, because although they were more violent, they recognised the peasantry’s
right to subsistence by allowing limited farming or woodcutting.
Secondly, villagers would submit petitions to the reserve authorities asking them for help,
such as agricultural assistance, housing repairs, or community projects such as repairing the
road running through the village. Villagers felt that the reserve had a moral debt to them, as
similar assistance promised when the reserve was created had not arrived, and because the
villagers had sacrificed their use of the forest to allow its creation – as one villager stated “if
you give something to someone, you expect something in return” (interview, El Arroyazo,
March 2007). Requests for help were always refused by FP, yet villagers persisted in asking,
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albeit at a declining rate. When questioned about why they persisted, one housewife
explained that there was an informal understanding that FP have an obligation to help the
villagers (interview, El Arroyazo, April 2007). During another conversation, a farmer in El
Arroyazo likened FP to the Haitian immigrants who had first arrived in the area in the last 15
years, in that villagers provided assistance or loans yet this would not be reciprocated, adding
“Progressio are worse than Haitians, at least Haitians say thank you” (interview, El Arroyazo,
February 2007). Villagers argue that the forest had belonged to the nation, and therefore its
purpose was to support its citizens, but this was removed without sufficient compensation.
The minimal help, such as some initial outreach projects, helping repair one house, and
employing some locals, was considered grossly insufficient – one resident argued that “What
they take away from us is much more than what they give” (interview, El Arryazo, April
2007). During one conversation with a group of farmers, the man who had his house repaired
exclaimed that “three houses wouldn’t have made up for what I lost in the forest” (fieldnotes,
March 2007). Others contrasted FP lack of support with outreach provided by various rural
development programmes and organisations. FP argue that because the forest belonged to the
nation, it should provide benefits for the whole nation, such as conserving biodiversity and
preserving watersheds, rather than being ruined to support a few families. Furthermore, as the
head guard stated, the forest was “lent” to the villagers, not owned by them, and as the
reserve had not confiscated property, it has no moral obligation to compensate (interview, El
Arroyazo, February 2007). Many residents of El Arroyazo acknowledge that the reserve have
helped by protecting the forest, and therefore the watershed for the small river which flows
through the village, yet still argue that the reserve has an unpaid moral debt, and that they
would prefer it to disappear.
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Thirdly, at least in El Arroyazo, there was a rise in more obvious forms of resistance. Forest
fires were occasionally set on the edge of the reserve, particularly immediately after the
introduction of a new reserve regulation. Villagers explained that such action against the core
reserve area was angry, spontaneous, and unplanned, rather than a strategic move to abolish
the reserve. One farmer admitted to setting some fires in the mid 1990s, but said that he and
his neighbours did so out of anger at the impacts of regulations, rather than any expectation
that the reserve would disappear. He viewed this as impossible, stating that “the state can do
what it likes and the campesino doesn’t matter”, adding that he stopped setting fires because
it was futile (interview, El Arroyazo, March 2007). Buffer zone regulations were viewed
differently and as potentially challengeable. Attempts to impose regulations there were
sometimes met with violence, with both villagers and reserve authorities reporting that there
were frequent fights between guards and villagers, constraining guards’ ability to enforce
regulations in the buffer zone. Guards were unable to patrol the village because they would
be attacked with bottles and stones. The extension of the reserve’s activities into the buffer
zone was viewed as illegitimate, as it was private land, not the reserve. One farmer explained
that guards were “messing in things that were not theirs”, and that he fought consequently
fought them because their heavy-handed regulations were “abusive” (fieldnotes, February
2007). Other villagers recalled incidents where attempts to regulate certain practices in the
buffer zone led to standoffs between guards armed with guns and villagers armed with
machetes.
Villagers’ resistance attempted to create a counter-territorialisation of the reserve. Firstly,
their actions and discourses around implicit resistance were an attempt to assert their version
of the meaning and purpose of the forest, as a source of subsistence for local people. The
claims for help and compensation compliment this, by further asserting their moral right of
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access to the forest, and their entitlement to compensation should this be impinged, with the
reserve presenting a counter-discourse. It was not an attempt to remove the territorial entity
of the reserve in its entirety, but rather to redefine it. Finally, the violence and accompanying
discourse represents villagers’ attempts to assert their private property rights over the
reserve’s claimed right to regulate activity in the buffer zone. This resistance is largely about
territory, a contestation over social relations, legitimacy, and moral economy grounded in
specific spaces.
This resistance had a mixed impact. Firstly, no overt resistance, such as violence, was
possible in La Sal. As La Sal was considered a hotspot of woodcutting, the reserve focused its
initial activities there, recruiting a number of local men as guards, intending to turn poachers
into gamekeepers – discouraging locals from cutting trees by giving them waged employment
in protecting them, although senior staff such as the head guard and reserve director were
recruited from the lowlands. Consequently, the guards enforcing reserve regulations were the
neighbours, relatives, and friends of those accused of breaking them, and intra-village social
ties became a key part of how villagers in La Sal interacted with the reserve. Social norms in
the villages emphasised avoiding conflict with neighbours, and so villagers felt unable to
fight back against the guards imposing regulations – one former resident of La Sal ventured
that former residents didn’t resist because they “were embarrassed or scared”, and another
emphasised that “people want to avoid punches” with people they know (fieldnotes, April
2007). The guards themselves acknowledged the importance of this trend – one explaining
that it is easier to patrol their home village because “people always listen to their friends”
(interview, February 2007), and consequently they could verbally reprimand someone
committing an infraction rather than needing to be more confrontational. The strength of this
social norm of avoiding conflict with ones neighbours, even when it affects individual
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livelihoods, is illustrated by several other examples where conflict has occurred or been
avoided in El Arroyazo. La Sal no longer exists, for reasons explained below, but social
dynamics within El Arroyazo provide a good insight into how La Sal might have operated, as
the two villages are only 10 kilometres apart, and interview data from residents of both
villages, including former residents of La Sal who now reside in El Arroyazo, indicate that
the social and economic relations in both sites were broadly similar. Firstly, the arrival of
Haitian migrants in El Arroyazo to work in coffee plantations and commercial agriculture in
recent decades has increased social tensions, with Haitians accused of depressing wages and
increasing crime. There is widespread prejudice against Haitians throughout Dominican
society (Howard, 2001; Wucker, 1999). Haitian migrants are highly transitory, spending a
few months in the area, own no property, and few speak Spanish. As such, villagers have few
social relations with migrants, other than encounters at village shops, or when they are both
hired to work in plantations. Villagers do not blame plantation owners for this influx, but
rather three of their fellow villagers who rent single room shacks as accommodation to the
migrants. Whilst villagers let these landlords know their displeasure anonymously and
indirectly through village rumour and gossip, they avoid conflict by avoiding direct
confrontation. One villager in El Arroyazo explained that whilst she was deeply unhappy that
her neighbour rented out a shack, she never discussed it with him because “If I went to
confront someone about this, it would become my problem” (interview, El Arroyazo, March
2007). The neighbour in question knew his neighbours disapproved, but said both parties
were happy to avoid confrontation, adding “if people don’t bother me, then I don’t bother
them” (interview, El Arroyazo, March 2007). A second example concerns two examples from
El Arroyazo of conflicts between siblings over the unequal distribution of inherited land. In
one, the inequality was contested, resulting in a complete social rupture between siblings,
who do not speak over to one another, even a decade later. In the other, the inequality was
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tolerated as the brother who received less land decided that contesting it was not worth the
inevitable lost social capital, as he relied on his brother, one of the few car owners in the
village, to take his produce to market.
Following their unwillingness to fight back, villagers in La Sal acquiesced to regulations until
livelihoods were so constrained that outmigration was the only option. One former resident of
La Sal explained that “it was easier to leave than to fight” (interview, March 2007). A key
point was Hurricane George in 1998, during which the concrete bridge connecting La Sal to
the outside world was swept away, leaving the village isolated. Eventually, a wealthy aspiring
politician funded the construction of a fragile wire suspension bridge, but unlike the previous
bridge this allowed only pedestrian and not vehicular access. This made transporting goods in
and out of the village much more difficult, accelerating outmigration until by 2003 the village
was completely abandoned. Most residents moved to lowland cities, although some married
into families in neighbouring villages. Presently, most fields have been reclaimed by the
forest, although some families who remained in the area maintain small coffee plantations
there, which require only sporadic visits. Former residents of La Sal blame FP and the reserve
for this predicament, one stating that “they [FP] ended the community”, and another that
“they threw us out” (interviews, Paso Bajito, March 2007). They accuse FP of not
contributing to reconstructing the bridge in order to induce them to leave. The head guard
argues that it is preferable for the reserve that no one lives in La Sal.
During the time when regulations led to outmigration in La Sal (1990s and early 2000s), there
were no social ties between reserve guards and villagers in El Arroyazo. As a result, this
opened up a space for resistance, often violent, which allowed villagers to retain control over
private land in the buffer zone. In an oft-recalled incident in 1998, a guard tried to prevent
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some farmers burning stubble in their field in the buffer zone. The farmers, incensed at the
latest of many interventions in their livelihoods, chased the guard away with their machetes,
nearly catching him, which could have been fatal. Both FP and local villagers explained that
following this incident, the guards refrained from intervening in the buffer zone around El
Arroyazo, turning a blind eye to many practices and, only in the most serious of incidents,
calling in Foresta to intervene on their behalf. Villagers now openly cut small trees and burn
stubble, knowing that guards will not intervene. As the head guard explained, they “want to
avoid situations of conflict with the community” (interview, El Arroyazo, March 2007).
Violent resistance successfully limited FP’s attempts to create and define a buffer zone, at
least around El Arroyazo.
In the subsequent decade, conflict declined for three reasons: Firstly, whilst villagers remain
adamant that they would like the reserve to disappear, their anger has diminished with time–
one villager stated that they have “forgotten about the forest”, and how much they depended
on it (interview, El Arroyazo, April 2007). Local people now put minimal pressure on the
reserve, and the forest is recovering. Villagers still consider that removing the reserve entirely
is impossible and beyond their abilities. Secondly, whilst villagers initially struggled to
sustain themselves on the small amounts of private land using traditional subsistence crops,
the rise of intensive commercial floriculture in the mid-1990s in El Arroyazo allowed farmers
to support themselves using relatively small amounts of land. One farmer commented that “If
we didn’t have land outside, the reserve would have finished us like La Sal” (fieldnotes,
March 2007). Floriculture arose because the unique micro-climate of the area is sufficiently
cool and wet to grow European flowers such as roses and lilies, and because the paving of the
road to the lowlands allowed these highly perishable crops to reach market. The road also
allowed commercial agriculture to enter El Arroyazo, with outside companies buying land
and constructing two greenhouses growing tomatoes for the urban market. These industries,
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like the transient Haitian populations, post-date the reserve’s creation and have no interaction
with it. Thirdly, from around 1998 onwards, a few villagers in El Arroyazo began working
for the reserve, despite the low wages paid, allowing non-confrontational interactions
between local people and guards. At present, there is a stalemate where the guards enforce
the reserve and the buffer zone, excluding the area around El Arroyazo. There, residents and
guards mutually avoid each other – one villager explained “they [the reserve] are and we are
here….If you don’t offend them, they don’t offend you” (interview, El Arroyazo, March
2007). With the exception of guards originally from El Arroyazo, no FP staff socialise in the
village, despite their headquarters being one kilometre up the road. As La Sal lies
abandoned, El Arroyazo prospers through floriculture. Whilst the reserve regulated and
imposed meaning on the core reserve area and the buffer zone around La Sal, to minimal
challenges from villagers, in El Arroyazo villagers successfully challenged the reserve’s
regulation and definition, and imposed their own meaning.
This history of conflict and antipathy does not appear in outside representations of the
reserve. Compounding their resentment at the lack of compensation and promised assistance,
some villagers are angry that FP produce literature and other media claiming that help and
compensation had been provided. One housewife exclaimed that “I have seen them on
television saying that they gave bicycles to all the children so they could get to school. I ask
you if you can find a child in the community who has received a bicycle” (interview, El
Arroyazo, December 2006). FP’s director claimed that substantial assistance had been
provided; “we made an aqueduct, we improved all the latrines. We improved all the stoves.
We improved the houses, and we helped improve the school, which only went to third grade”
(interview, Santo Domingo, December 2006). Former residents of La Sal contradicted this,
claiming that only limited standpipes had been provided. Furthermore, FP’s director stated
that former residents abandoned La Sal “voluntarily and freely” to live in communities with
29
electricity and telephone connections, which contradicts former residents’ accounts. More
importantly, FP put active barriers preventing villagers’ accounts from reaching outside
audiences. For example, in 2007 the government required FP to write a formal management
plan for the reserve, after nearly two decades of working without one. A consultant was
contracted to undertake participatory planning activities with villagers, yet the attendees were
selected by FP, who ensured that, as the reserve director put it, only “key actors”, who are
“leaders” and “open minded” were invited, meaning people who wouldn’t criticise the
reserve, rather than those who were “closed minded, who don’t understand the issues”
(fieldnotes, April 2007). Consequently, the meeting was attended by only 4 people from El
Arroyazo: 1 man who was the only person in the village to be universally positive about the
reserve, and 3 women. 12 women and 3 men from villages further away were also present.
The gender divide is important as agriculture is highly gendered – only 3 women (2 widows
and 1 married but independent-minded individual) in El Arroyazo are directly involved in
cultivating family owned land, none of whom were present. All other women work as
housewives or paid labour, though some prepare flowers for market once they have been
harvested. This ensured that discussions were limited to issues such as domestic sanitation,
rather than access to resources and farmland. Similarly, villagers’ petitions for help are
always directed to the head guard and the reserve director, rather than FP’s head office in
Santo Domingo or to board members, as villagers have no way of accessing them. Guards
claim that FP’s directors almost never visit the reserve. The net result is that FP are portrayed
to government and donor agencies as generous and benevolent to local people, and no
mention is made of conflicts, injustices, the illegality of buffer zone regulation, or the
hardships local people endured.
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2.4 Territoriality and resistance around Ebano Verde
The creation of Ebano Verde Scientific Reserve demonstrates three features common to many
accounts of processes of internal territorialisation and the creation of protected areas – the
designation of protected areas as people-free places, imposed top-down by a distant state,
which was resisted by counter-territorialisation by local people. Here, the Dominican state
and FP created a new spatial entity – a reserve - with new delineations on maps, new land use
restrictions written into statute. These were communicated and given meaning by armed
guards using the full legal and juridical force of the state on people challenging these
meanings. FP successfully imposed a top-down definition of the reserve as a place for nature,
not people, removing and de-legitimising local people’s presence. FP’s power to create was
such that they could create and enforce a buffer zone in some areas, over-riding private
property rights, despite such buffers having no legal status. The territorialisation of the
reserve and buffer greatly disrupted the uses and meanings local people had for these spaces.
Local resistance was an attempt to assert counter-meanings to the reserve territory,
challenging who owned local natural resources, who had access to them, what their purpose
was, and decides this. This is expressed in both the actions taken and the accompanying
discourses. The net result of this tension between local and state/NGO territorialisation was
an arrangement combining aspects of both. Firstly, there is a reserve demarcated on maps and
on the ground through signage, designating it as a place for nature, conserving biodiversity
and water sources for all Dominican citizens, entrusted to an NGO. This is widely considered
to be ecologically successful, with forest expanding and endangered species recovering in
number (Abt Associates, 2002). Secondly, this is surrounded by a buffer zone where human
activity is technically allowed and where land is privately owned, but in reality land use is
subject to strict conditions, and de facto control lies with FP. Here forests are expanding into
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many of the abandoned fields. Thirdly, around El Arroyazo local people have asserted their
ownership and right to decide what happens, and where the purpose of natural resources is to
support local residents’ livelihoods. Importantly, whilst these territories have remained
relatively static in recent years, there is no assurance that this will continue.
This case, like many others (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Brockington, 2004; Brockington and
Igoe, 2006;, Holmes, 2007), shows that organisations creating and running protected areas
frequently have much greater abilities to define and defend territories than local people. FP
operate at the national scale, they are well connected to government (as the head guard
explained “‘[our directors] can phone up the [presidential] palace if they need to” – interview,
El Arroyazo, March 2007), and they use the state’s legal-juridical power and legitimised
monopoly on violence. They can unilaterally shape outsiders’ understandings of the reserve,
and they have sufficient resources to finance their operations. This gives them freedom and
authority to create regulations, even without sound legal basis, and the resources to weather
long term resistance. Villagers were unable to make their discourses of injustice and the
peasant’s right to the forest and claims for compensation spread beyond the village, initially
because of a fear of violence reprisals (see Neumann, 2001, Holmes, 2007), and later because
they lacked a conduit or bridging organisation (see Almudi and Berkes, 2010, Beazley, 2009)
that would allow them to operate in the same arenas as Fundación Progressio, as villagers’
own statements on their impotence attest. Their distance from decisions was such that they
were not even aware of the discussions to create the reserve. Even participatory workshops,
supposedly a way for their voice to be heard, were ultimately controlled by FP. This
powerlessness should be seen as part of a continuing historical marginalisation of the
peasantry in the Dominican Republic, a product of centralisation of power and the
peasantry’s lack of power, wealth, and influence (Moya Pons, 1995; Turits, 2003). Unlike FP,
the residents of La Sal and El Arroyazo lacked access to political arenas, personal
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connections to decision makers, knowledge of political processes, land laws, and their legal
rights, or the financial resources to mount a legal challenge to their predicament. The result of
this, an acquiescence to the reserve in many respects, combined with some everyday
resistance, is both a continuation of how peasants in the Dominican Republic have responded
to state intervention in their livelihoods and a similar story to that of many protected areas in
Latin America and elsewhere (Holmes, 2007; Moya Pons, 1995; Norgrove and Hulme, 2006;
Ojeda, 2012; Turits, 2003)
3.1 CONCLUSION
This paper adds to existing literature exploring the territorialisation of protected areas, and
the insights this provides to debates on the social impacts of protected areas and local
resistance to them. Conflicts over protected areas are long term, evolving, yet often uneven
struggles by different parties to define and defend their version of the territory. The case of
Ebano Verde adds to other case studies of Latin American protected areas which demonstrate
state and NGO-led processes of top-down territorialisation which redefines places as largely
people-free landscapes, disrupting local relationships with the land, and leading to protracted
resistance (Cardozo, 2011; Grandia, 2007; Mollett, 2010; Ojeda, 2012; Sundberg, 1998;
Ybarra, 2012).
Despite rhetoric about decentralisation, decision making for protected areas often remains
centralised with the state or transnational conservation NGOs, a top down process, isolated
from local people (Corson, 2011; Holmes, 2011; Nelson and Agrawal, 2008; Sundberg,
2003). As this and other cases demonstrate, the creation of buffer zones as part of attempts to
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integrate local land ownership and land uses into protected areas, to create co-benefits for
biodiversity and local people, can in turn become further sites for contestation.
Yet recent years have seen indigenous and community conserved areas come to prominence
in conservation discourses and policies – protected areas owned, managed and designed in
large part by the people who live in and around them (Berkes, 2008). This acts as a counter
current to top-down territorialisation, but remain rather neglected within the geography
literature. As well as these bottom-up protected areas, there should be consideration of the
processes which allow local people’s voices to impact upon protected area policies. Indeed,
the “disobedient knowledges” produced by academic critiques of conservation may be such a
process, and this paper should be read in such a light (Igoe, Sullivan, and Brockington, 2010).
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